It has been one of the world’s oddest but strongest and most enduring relationships: the world’s oldest democracy and world’s most unalloyed monarchy. The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kept communism out of the Middle East and, following the 9/11 tragedy, mounted joint efforts to rid the region of violent extremism. With American political leadership, the Saudis maintained critical stability in the world’s oil markets. As cooperation was in their respective vital national and regional interests, the sons of Ibn Saud were schooled from birth, “The American relationship must be protected and preserved.”

Over the last ten years, however, Saudi Arabia’s discontent, verging on outrage, with the progress of events in the Middle East has become palpable.

– In neighboring Iraq, the U.S. replaced a Sunni-led government with a Shia government and then withdrew its forces.

– The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an especially emotional issue for King Abdullah, saw progress stall, discord between Hamas and Fatah accelerate, and Israeli settlements expand.

– Syria’s two and a half-year war has deteriorated from a popular revolt against a dictator to a sectarian ethnic civil war producing hundreds of deaths and thousands of refugees per month; its dictator’s continued rule no longer seems in question.

– In the rest of the region, especially Egypt, turmoil and uncertainty hang heavy as old regimes are toppled and Islamists step in.

– And now, the Kingdom’s arch nemesis, Iran, has launched a peace and friendship campaign to remove crippling UN sanctions in exchange for what the Saudis expect will be a temporary and inadequate rollback of the Islamic state’s nuclear program.

Its forbearance exhausted, the Saudi leadership has taken the momentous decision to reevaluate its most strategic partnership, including downgrading its intelligence cooperation with the U.S. The Kingdom and especially King Abdullah now harbor profound reservations about America’s feckless role in the Middle East. Saudi leadership does not trust the U.S. to strike a deal with Iran that protects their interests and those of the Kingdom. The Kingdom’s recent ill-advised rejection of a prestigious Security Council seat indicates that it also places little trust in the UN Security Council. In the Bedouin code of the desert, loss of trust is fatal to a relationship.

But there is another reason for Saudi disenchantment: America’s “preoccupation” with democracy in the Middle East. It started in earnest under the administration of George W. Bush, first in Iraq and then elsewhere under the aegis of the Middle East Partnership Initiative and USAID programs.

The problem is not democracy, per se, which the Saudis acknowledge has done wonderful things and brought great progress to the U.S. and the world. Rather, it is Middle Eastern democracy that makes them uneasy. It undermines traditional governance and injects uncertainty and instability, which the Saudis loathe. Furthermore, it invites more sinister elements, e.g., Islamists, to gain respectability and game the system to their sole advantage. A region wracked by sectarianism, tribal rivalries and myriad ethnic and religious divisions, in their admittedly myopic view, is simply not ready for the “chaos” of democracy. Bluntly stated, the region is unprepared and unsuited for democracy, at least for the foreseeable future.

Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and others do not make a convincing case for democracy. The Saudis would argue, better to support stable, predictable, pro-Western autocrats (or monarchs) to manage the region’s conflicted politics and keep things on an even keel. The U.S. need only provide the political cover and crucial military backing; the traditional, nonthreatening autocrats will do the rest.

The same argument could have been made for South Korea, Argentina, Mexico or Indonesia. But authoritarianism is on the decline, even if the Middle East may be its last redoubt. But first, let’s acknowledge that the way in which democracy – and the characteristic chaos that comes with it – is introduced to this complex and challenging region may have to be reassessed. This is especially true if we are to preserve regional stability, which both the U.S. and the Kingdom agree is vital.

Relatedly, the Saudis fear that the apparent recent warming between the U.S. and Iran may be due in part to our affinity for democracy. Iran exhibits some trappings, if little of the genuine foundational values, of democracy. If a nuclear accord is on the horizon, could rapprochement be far off?

To be sure, Saudi Arabia is not alone in its skepticism of U.S. will and intent in the Middle East. However, the repercussions of such views need urgent attention. The U.S. and the region, including Israel, can ill afford a Saudi Arabia operating at odds or without coordination with the U.S.; for example, in arming questionable opposition groups in Syria or in supporting military governments elsewhere. Furthermore, the Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons, another possible ramification of such fallout, would lead others to do the same, effectively destroying the NPT in the Middle East and exponentially increasing tensions.

Strong and quick action is now necessary to avert such a political catastrophe for both nations and the region. The U.S. should call for an invigorated strategic dialogue with Saudi Arabia that would include interaction at the highest levels. First, they should set out to right the relationship. Second, they should seek a thorough understanding of how best to minimize the threat of Iran. Finally, there needs to be a frank dialog on our differing views and values about governance in the region, working perhaps toward a common position on Syria, including dealing with the various opposition groups there.

But for the U.S., there is another critical objective: preserve the 68-year old strategic partnership indispensable to all our interests in the region.